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Masculinist Theory and Romantic Authorship, 
Or Hawthorne, Politics, Desire
David Greven
In the powerful hands of critics such Sacvan Bercovitch, Jonathan Arac, and John Carlos Rowe, Nathaniel Hawthorne as artist and per-son assumes the shape of an unattractively conservative writer whose 
works alternately achieve political consensus through the reconciliation of 
opposing points of view, all ostensibly given their platform yet fused into 
one, reactionary position of social inaction (Bercovitch); reveal a writer 
whose politics facilitated the slave trade even as it pulled the curtain over 
the oncoming onslaught of the Civil War (Arac); ingeniously innovate 
the literary means of American global colonization (Rowe). To read such 
bold and authoritative critics on Hawthorne is to believe that a reaction-
ary and racist writer continues to occupy a stable position in American 
high school and college curriculums. In this essay, taking these critics’ 
positions as metonymic of an entire approach to literature in academic 
writing—a cross-fertilized version of Foucauldian and Marxian theories,1 
which in its most common application in literary criticism and theory 
we can, crudely, call the “Bad Politics” school of leftist criticism2—I will 
demonstrate that, however valid and illuminating their positions prove 
to be, these critics’ views of Hawthorne not only mutilate Hawthorne’s 
work but also rely on surprisingly heterosexist and masculinist approaches 
to the study of imaginative literature. Considering the work of these crit-
ics on Hawthorne allows us to examine a particular, influential trend in 
academic writing from the 1980s to the present.
What is most distressing about this political critique of Hawthorne’s 
work is the way in which it frames what is and is not “political.” Gender 
gets mentioned, dutifully, but there is little sustained engagement with 
gendered themes. Perhaps this problem stems from biases and blind 
spots inherent in Marxism: as Joan Wallach Scott observes, “within Marx-
ism, the concept of gender has long been treated as the by-product of 
changing economic structures; gender has had no independent analytic 
status of its own.”3 The relegation of gendered issues to the sidelines 
confuses as much as it disturbs; as critics such as Helene Moglen remind 
us, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fiction reacted primarily to the 
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social and psychological strains of the modern sex-gender system, so 
the failure to include a sustained analysis of the gendered dynamics of 
politics is a considerable blind spot.4 Yet, from another perspective, ques-
tions of gender may be said to preoccupy leftist literary criticism. In a 
remarkably obvious manner, politics here connotes the public sphere of 
male ideas, ideas put into publicly visible place and the effects of men 
of action, or, more pertinently in Hawthorne’s case, the effects created 
by a failure to act. 
The leftist treatment of a Romantic author like Hawthorne evokes 
longstanding debates in criticism over American literature itself, the 
asseveration of the superiority of realism over romance that has been 
with us at least since Henry James in his critical study of Hawthorne. A 
“prominent function of claiming to be a realist or a naturalist,” argues 
Michael Davitt Bell, “was to provide assurance to one’s society and oneself 
that one was a ‘real’ man rather than an effeminate ‘artist.’”5 Lionel Trill-
ing’s essay “Reality in America” remains relevant for our current critical 
predicament.6 As Americanists, we have not yet budged from our posi-
tion at what Trilling described as “the dark and bloody crossroads where 
literature and politics meet.” “One does not go there gladly,” remarks 
Trilling, “but nowadays it is not exactly a matter of free choice whether 
one does or does not go” (9). Trilling continues to pose many political 
problems as a critic, as evinced by his vexing denigration of Steinbeck 
and Dreiser. (Jonathan Schaub’s study of Cold War literary criticism offers 
several useful insights into the postwar criticism in which Trilling played 
so vital a part, particularly in what Schaub calls the “liberal narrative” 
guiding postwar thought.7) But Trilling’s nowadays are our nowadays. We 
continue to be vexed by this “deadly sin,” the “turning away from reality” 
(5), as Trilling put it. Despite the manner in which he himself questioned 
the “reality,” or lack thereof, in Hawthorne’s fiction, Henry James, wrote 
Trilling, is traditionally put, “by liberal critics,” “to the ultimate question: 
of what use, of what political use, are his gifts and their intention?” (9), 
the same kinds of questions raised over Hawthorne today (and James, 
still, and many others). Leftist critiques to the contrary, however, Trilling, 
in Hawthorne’s defense, wrote that “Hawthorne was dealing beautifully 
with realities, with substantial things . . . dealing exactly with reality” (7). 
Whose reality is it, and what, exactly, constitutes reality?
“In the study of American literature,” wrote William C. Spengemann, 
“where nationality, as [René] Wellek noted, is not linguistically definite, 
nonliterary history has been seen as especially crucial to literary history.”8 
Responding to this “deep suspicion regarding literary values,” conducted 
by historians and historicist literary critics, Spengemann concluded, 
“Granted its premises, the historical method is virtually guaranteed to 
produce a literary history that is not a history of literature.”9 Our cur-
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rent (leftist) critical practice, conducted by the current generation of 
historicist literary critics, devotes itself entirely to the enumeration and 
elucidation of what Philip Fisher called the “hard facts” of American 
history. The importance of these facts—especially racial oppression 
embodied most prominently in the conjoined horrors of slavery and 
Indian removal—indubitably endures. But the preponderance of hard 
facts criticism begs the question: is there a place for soft facts—for beauty, 
desire, eros, the aesthetic, for love, for what Hélène Cixous calls, in the 
context of Edgar Allan Poe’s fiction, “the soft and mysterious violence 
of writing”?10 Roughly speaking, the hard facts, Bad Politics school of 
American literary theory and criticism focuses on historical “reality” at 
the expense of other concerns. 
The underlying anxiety would appear to be that talking about soft facts 
makes critics soft; the accumulation of hard facts and commensurately 
hard approaches to them pleasingly hardens the critic’s work, makes it 
more solid and substantial. Political criticism emerges as a curious means 
of reestablishing a coherent masculinism always already threatened by 
the feminizing enterprise of literature. In a provocative essay, James J. 
Sosnoski writes that, “It is remarkable still that the main opponents to New 
Criticism in the 1960s did not question the view that literary criticism, 
even though it could not muster exacting objectivity, should be mod-
eled on the sciences.” As a result, for “the most part, modern criticism 
is based on the notion that readings can be objective, impersonal and 
detached, that there is a discipline of literary criticism.”11 The objectivist, 
empirical standards that control a great deal of leftist thought preclude 
the messy, “feminine” qualities, to wax Cixousian, of emotional engage-
ment, personal meaning, and responses to beauty that are also and just 
as deeply integral to literary experience. 
In his study Criticism and Social Change, Frank Lentricchia categorizes 
three kinds of intellectual: the radical intellectual, who fights for the 
working class; the traditional intellectual, a cosmopolitan connoisseur 
of ideas who claims to maintain a position outside power and politics 
and champions disinterested critical values and universal truths; and 
the kind of intellectual he wants leftist critics to be, the specific intel-
lectual, who struggles to transform his or her immediate institutional 
and intellectual domain.12 The specific intellectual, focusing (rather 
monastically, like Hawthorne’s ill-fated scholar Fanshawe) intently on 
his own specific areas of study, should not distract himself or step out 
of his place through connections with local and public forms of activism 
but, instead, should do what he was trained to do—critique prevailing 
ideological structures and their discursive articulations. Lentricchia’s 
association of the traditional intellectual with qualities such as cosmo-
politanism and connoisseurship illuminates many of the attitudes and, 
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frankly, the biases of leftist critique. Though Lentricchia’s model of the 
traditional critic might suggest considerable possibilities for pleasure as 
well as insight in its evocation of figures such as the debonair, decadent 
bachelor, for leftist criticism fictionists or critics who exude such inac-
tive, useless qualities are far too louche, far too decadent—they are not 
only indolent outsiders, but also threatening, perhaps even pernicious. 
It is a negative model of the feminized nonproductive mind, the insuf-
ficiently politicized critic as fop. “The root idea” of effeminacy, writes 
Alan Sinfield, “is a male falling away from the purposeful reasonableness 
that is supposed to constitute manliness, into the laxity and weakness 
conventionally attributed to women. . . . The function of effeminacy, as 
a concept, is to police sexual categories, keeping them pure.” Crucially 
for our discussion, “the effects of such policing extend vastly beyond 
lesbians and gay men . . . the whole order of sexuality and gender is 
pinioned by the fears and excitements that gather around the allegedly 
inappropriate distribution of gender categories.”13 Hawthorne and the 
insufficiently politicized (and implicitly male) critic both fall into the 
dread category of effeminacy in their precarious loss of the purposeful 
reasonableness of conscientiously “political” goals and aims.
Leftist criticism reveals that a deep-seated anxiety over which role 
literature should play in our culture endures; despite the validity of 
the ideological concerns brought to bear on literature, being forced 
to bear the burden of accounting for and negotiating the ideological 
problems of not only its own historical milieu but also our own is an 
undue burden to place on most texts and most authors, especially when, 
as in Hawthorne’s case, their ideological profile is so blurry, such a cross 
between conservative and radical qualities. A good deal of the anxious 
strong-arming of literary works in leftist criticism can be read as an 
attempt to quell anxieties over the eternal discomfort produced by lit-
erature, with its goads to sensual lassitude, in a hard, materialist culture 
still dominated by Puritan standards of utility. More directly relevant, 
the enormous difficulty at the heart of leftist criticism is its assumption 
that all readers share its values, all writers must share its values, and any 
readers and writers who do not share these values run the risk of being 
called immoral. This is not an exaggeration: Eric Cheyfitz, going far 
beyond Bercovitch and Arac (though not Rowe), accuses Hawthorne of 
an “immoral passivity.” 14 
To make my specific concerns clearer, I will closely engage with the 
arguments of Rowe and Arac in the following sections. The goal of this 
engagement will be to demonstrate the ways in which an occluded yet 
palpable gendered politics undergirds the stated political agendas of even 
the most sophisticated post-Trilling leftist critique.
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Rowe’s Globalizing Hawthorne
The title of the recent collection of essays edited by Millicent Bell, 
Hawthorne and the Real, signals the current preoccupations of Hawthorne 
scholarship. Almost all of the essays in the collection, Bell writes, exhibit 
“a common intent to explore, in one way or another, in one or another 
of Hawthorne works, the relation of his imagination to ‘the real’—that 
is, to the social reality he sometimes claimed to find uninteresting or 
unrepresentable. They make an argument for the interpretation of 
Hawthorne’s writings as more expressive of the objective common con-
ditions and public issues of his day than has been conceded until quite 
recently.”15 It is difficult to know in which manner Bell means “recently,” 
since the volume appears to be in keeping with the trend to interrogate 
Hawthorne’s association with real-world concerns undertaken since the 
1980s. In any event, the title overinscribes a particular understanding of 
“real” issues in Hawthorne—not the domain of the unrepresentable that 
the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan famously described as the “real,” 
but precisely that which presumably exists always to be represented, the 
real of social reality. Lacan’s brilliantly counterintuitive terming of the 
mysterious and indescribable as that which is the real conjures up far too 
many tangled issues to go into here, but, for now, what I wish to suggest is 
that the associations of the Lacanian real can stand in for what has been 
consciously eschewed in Hawthorne criticism, in this regard metonymic 
of current academic practice: any concerns that are unquantifiable and 
unclassifiable, that do not lend themselves easily to critical discussion, 
research, and argument, in short, the imaginative project of literature. 
(That Bell is the editor of this volume itself makes a political point as a 
microcosmic narrative of critical history; the author of a famous 1960s 
book on Hawthorne and aesthetics, Hawthorne’s View of the Artist, is now 
the editor of a volume that places Hawthorne’s social reality, not his 
aesthetics, at the forefront.)
The attempt to blast away at the wall of presumed indifference to 
social realities that Hawthorne put up throughout his career is most 
likely a salutary one, and this collection boasts a number of penetrating, 
insightful, necessary essays that, if any doubts existed before, confirms 
the reality that Hawthorne was a political figure of great importance in 
his own era, and that the very issues to which Hawthorne always claimed 
to be indifferent—abolition, race, women’s rights, national politics—are 
central to his oeuvre. In no manner do I dispute the urgency of these 
concerns. My concern here is the manner in which a particular ap-
proach to Hawthorne says far less about this writer’s work than it does 
about academic criticism and shared agendas for the study of American 
literature. 
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In his essay in Hawthorne and the Real, “Nathaniel Hawthorne and 
Transnationality,” John Carlos Rowe baldly states his agenda in his first 
paragraph. Rowe, disputing Henry James’s negative assessment of Haw-
thorne’s provincialism, writes, “Today we are interested in the history of 
our current global situation and the transnational forces that challenge 
the nation state and other traditional sociopolitical organizations. In order 
to understand these phenomena, we would do well to study Hawthorne’s 
fiction, which represents an older world transformed by the new forces 
of modernization, first announced by the industrial revolution in Eng-
land and made more urgent and dangerous in the expansionist frenzy 
of Jacksonian America.”16 Rowe explicitly sees his work as an updating of 
Bercovitch’s influential 1991 study The Office of The Scarlet Letter; his argu-
ment fuses Bercovitch and postcolonial theory. Bercovitch wrote about 
Hawthorne’s desire to create consensus through the reconciliation of 
opposing points of view, all of which bolster an ultimate affirmation of 
liberal individualism; Rowe, extending the Bercovitchian position, goes 
further, arguing that “the abstraction of liberal individualism from its 
historical and geopolitical possibility in nineteenth-century America is 
Hawthorne’s way of contributing to what today we recognize as cultural 
colonialism”; indeed, Hawthorne’s “romantic regionalism is a trick that 
serves expansionist political and cultural purposes” (91). The Salem 
custom house, where Hawthorne worked and from which he was fired 
before the publication of The Scarlet Letter and which he made the focus 
of the ambiguous essay that precedes the novel, “where the identification 
of products according to their national origins” leads to the determina-
tion of what is “permissible and forbidden within the republic,” is the 
kind of “aesthetic, transnational space” that for Rowe “marks precisely 
the national border as the model for other boundaries” (91). Rowe 
seizes upon the implications of the term “citizen” in Hawthorne’s famous 
phrase in “The Custom-House” essay, “I am a citizen of somewhere else,” 
linking Hawthorne’s use of citizen with “that of the citoyen declared by 
the French Revolution” (92). For Rowe, such a linkage could only be 
“ironic,” since Hawthorne “links citizenship with the Terror and thus 
follows the conservative interpretation of how the French revolt against 
monarchy was a democratic failure” (93). Resisting any claim of literature 
as a “utopian” space, Rowe’s major concern here is with what he calls 
Hawthorne’s self-endowed “transmigratory” ability to inhabit a whirling 
array of different spaces, and thereby defy not only social and national, 
but also temporal borders—indeed, constraints of any kind. Hawthorne, 
with his references to classical antiquity and the witch-hunting Puritan 
American past, can roam the centuries as well as nations, and as such 
an unmoored—yet always squarely, firmly fixed American—citizen, 
Hawthorne can travel anywhere, at least inasmuch as his authorial self 
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and created worlds give him license to do so. One might argue that the 
onanistic rapture thus suggested by this endlessly mobile imaginative 
agency sounds rather appealing, yet Rowe has neither time nor truck 
with pleasure here: transmigratory fiction as a “literary contribution to 
social practice tends to be conservative, insofar as it attempts to regulate 
a trauma that threatens social order” (95). This conservative maneuver is 
the “aesthetic sleight-of-hand by which the literary author (Hawthorne), 
the marginalized and abused woman (Hester), and the bastard child 
(Pearl) are transformed into leaders of a spiritual and moral revival 
of an otherwise corrupt U.S. democracy.” Echoing Bercovitch, Rowe 
asserts that Hawthorne uses “his imaginative play with political dissent 
within the perfectly recognizable conventions of American self-reliant 
individualism,” all in the covert attempt to win the “ruling-class author-
ity” to which he aspires (97–98).
The chief ideological perniciousness of The Scarlet Letter for Rowe ap-
pears to be that its heroine, Hester Prynne, trades in “her potential for 
overt social revolution” for “the subtler, psychological transformation 
she helps Dimmesdale [the minister with whom she committed the sin 
of adultery and the father of her illegitimate child] achieve on his own,” 
which mirrors Hawthorne’s own transmogrification of a personal desire 
for political revolution into what Rowe, citing himself in an earlier essay, 
calls “aesthetic dissent,” “the romantic idealist assumption that rigorous 
reflection on the processes of thought and representation constitutes in 
itself a critique of social reality and effects a transformation of the naive 
realism that confuses truth with social convention” (97). Hawthorne’s 
failed political activism is not just conservative but also hopelessly 
“naive,” self-deluded.
Many, probably most of us, in academia would agree more or less with 
the outlying goals of Rowe’s essay: to interrogate U.S. global hegemony 
and critique the national megalomania that inspires it. What is disturbing, 
however, is the assumption that a literary character—and an author—must 
be a political revolutionary in order to be fully realized, to say nothing 
of truly inspired and inspiring, and, implicitly, truly moral. Social revo-
lution here utterly, unquestionably trumps subtle interior change, and, 
implicitly, any subjective experience. Radicalism not only happens on 
the outside, it is projected outward, it has material implications, obvious, 
visible, thoroughly empirical effects in the material and social world. 
Hawthorne’s romancer’s ability to inhabit multiple times and places in 
the act of imaginative authorship necessarily assumes a suspicious cast 
precisely because it is about myriad possibilities that have no clear, tan-
gible outcomes, save the literary objects, printed books, which do not 
connote empirical achievement—“Here is the result of my transmigra-
tory fantasy”—so much as they reify the troublesome, if not altogether 
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immoral, uselessness of literary fantasy, of literature itself. Considered 
in any depth at all, this absolutely utilitarian view of the usefulness of 
fantasy—which amounts to its own colonization of fantasy (in the Freud-
ian sense of “phantasy”) for its own ends—and literature smacks sharply 
of the era in which novels were considered immoral, goads to sensual 
indolence, back even further to Puritan categories of the necessary and 
the immoral in life. A deep, abiding strain in the Bad Politics school of 
Hawthorne criticism is the one inherited from the very beginnings of 
our national culture, an utter revulsion against uselessness figured as 
and through multivalent categories of luxury. “No figure,” as Lori Merish 
writes, “was as universally employed in discussions of luxury during the 
Enlightenment than the representation of luxury as ‘feminizing.’”17 It is 
precisely in this implicit view of authorial luxury that a covert—though, 
I hope, unwitting—gendered war on the “apolitical” author continues 
to be conducted.
Continuing the ambiguous academic critical practice of ransacking 
letters and journals for evidence of an author’s “real” character, Rowe 
uses Hawthorne’s Italian Notebooks for further evidence of his indifference 
to politics. “He takes comfort and even finds a certain charm in French 
troops occupying Rome. . . .What seems remarkable in Hawthorne’s oth-
erwise touristic impressions is the pleasure he takes in the cosmopolitan 
atmosphere in Rome and Italy, even when it is an effect of the political 
violence reshaping modern Europe” (99). Hawthorne’s indifference to 
the political tumult in Europe manifests itself for Rowe most amply in 
the novel Hawthorne wrote in the aftermath of his European travels, the 
1860 The Marble Faun. “Hawthorne Americanizes nineteenth-century Italy 
by projecting onto it his own fantasy of the transnational ideal for the 
American citizen, drawing both on the aura of ancient imperial Rome 
in its global reach and at the same time emphasizing the American 
transumption of this ‘ruined’ heritage” (100). Again linking his project 
to Bercovitch’s, Rowe positions The Marble Faun as another work that 
represents the transmutation of personal ambitions for revolution into 
what Bercovitch called a “vision of continuity.”18 Worse, The Marble Faun 
tames “the threats of Europe’s mid-century, nationalist revolutions and 
the international claims of women’s rights,” thereby “turning their related 
social problems into the aesthetic concerns and allegorical figures of an 
American romance”—no mean feat, and a truly “miraculous transforma-
tion” indeed. This final completed romance is Hawthorne’s “contribution 
to the transnational ambitions of U.S. ideology at the beginning of the 
Civil War and prophetically anticipates how U.S. cultural work today in-
corporates the histories and cultures of other peoples for its own glory 
and their control” (106).
A transformation of a different kind occurs in Rowe’s work: Rowe 
processes the perplexities and perversities, the irreconcilable and dis-
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cordant, the wild and unstable qualities of Hawthorne’s work into a 
uniform ideological sludge. The Marble Faun is not sludge; it’s more like 
a gumbo, an ideological gumbo full of diverse ingredients that each add 
to an overall consistency yet remain distinct. Hawthorne’s work contains 
radical elements as well as reactionary ones—its volatile interest in the 
female will to power and in female sexuality is as enduringly transgres-
sive as it is phobic; its attraction to Catholicism is at least as fervent as its 
calumniating revulsion to it; its uses of the classical past as much dena-
ture and defamiliarize the concepts of art and tradition as they exploit 
them for conservative, order-cincturing purposes. What the novel asks 
us, forces us, to do is to tangle with an endless array of aesthetic as well 
as political challenges, to negotiate its confusing, even tormenting, mix 
of metaphors and their multivalent purport. 
Yet Rowe insists upon this work’s coherence as both ideological product 
and ideological agent. Rowe straightens out a queer text—in the effort 
to make its ideological impact legible, he must make the work legible as 
well. The essential, inescapable quality of the novel, of Hawthorne’s art, 
is that it simply cannot be used for any one agenda’s purposes, including 
my own: I claim Hawthorne’s radicalism as a critic of heteronormative 
standards of gendered identity, but I cannot do so without acknowledg-
ing the severe lapses on his part in this regard. Rowe has no difficulty 
in presenting us with a Hawthorne whose work accommodates, in its 
accomodationist fashion, a coherent ideological agenda. What I want to 
suggest is that there are many other ways of responding to a literary work, 
or any work of art. A different terminology altogether can be employed 
to grapple with the work of what is irreducibly imaginative literature: 
beauty, eroticism, perversity. Academic criticism has so long abused these 
terms and their values—consider the current use of the word belletristic 
as a term of abuse—that perhaps, having been banished for so long, the 
terms and their values may now be productively, suggestively defamiliar-
ized and deroutinized, put to new uses. 
Gender concerns are indeed addressed in Rowe’s critique. Hawthorne’s 
purported gendered infractions include colonizing Hester’s “power as a 
‘prophetess’” in “becoming Hester and feeling in his own body the ‘burn-
ing heat’ of both her sin and her sex” (96), an experience he notes in the 
moment of “The Custom-House” essay in which he recalls (in a famous 
duplicitous literary flourish) having donned his heroine’s symbolic letter. 
Miriam Schaefer, the mixed race, possibly Jewish heroine of The Marble 
Faun “embodies the threat of liberated femininity in the arts and politics” 
that apparently earned Hawthorne’s opprobrium (100). For several rea-
sons, Rowe’s imputations of misogyny to Hawthorne are bizarre. While 
not the first to make such imputations, Rowe overlooks the radicalism in 
Hawthorne’s empathy for strong, brazen, difficult women in the novel-
new literary history980
romances. The act of placing Hester’s gravely freighted symbol on his 
own chest literalizes Hawthorne’s connection to women, femininity, and 
female experience. The Scarlet Letter continues to affect readers all over 
the globe profoundly precisely because Hawthorne makes Hester’s subjec-
tivity so complex, arresting, and interesting, qualities achieved precisely 
through Hawthorne’s imaginative empathy with woman’s experience 
(however ambivalent his overall treatment). Similarly, The Marble Faun’s 
Miriam and Zenobia in The Blithedale Romance may indeed be threaten-
ing figures, but Hawthorne also contrasts their vitality and strength to 
the brute oppressiveness of the male characters in the novels—however 
powerful and compelling they may be, they are nevertheless victimized by 
masculinist men who attempt to control and thwart them. It is hard not 
to see Rowe’s critique of Hawthorne on gender as halfhearted, a “While 
we’re on the subject of Hawthorne’s political failures . . .” gesture. By 
conscripting Hawthorne into a political plot, Rowe forces the unyield-
ingly apolitical Hawthorne to yield. Regeneration through violence is no 
less the recourse of the critic than it is of the fictionist.
Given the sensitivity and complexity of Rowe’s treatment of Henry 
James, whose gendered and sexual themes Rowe examines in his study 
The Other Henry James, Rowe’s adamantly ideological treatment of Haw-
thorne is especially striking and troublesome.19 One gets the sense that 
something particularly maddening and exasperating about Hawthorne 
exists for Rowe, whose interrogation of Hawthorne’s work renders it 
inert and ideologically suspect.
Arac and Action
Jonathan Arac’s elegant “The Politics of The Scarlet Letter” remains 
indelibly an index of the poststructuralist critique of Hawthorne’s work, 
centering on the slavery question that Hawthorne, by all accounts, kept 
ducking. Bercovitch took a different but like-minded and equally influ-
ential tack, arguing that Hawthorne’s ambiguity works to facilitate the 
proper functioning of the “office of the scarlet letter” on Hester Prynne, 
who, in Bercovitch’s argument, learns how to become properly socialized 
by renouncing her sexuality, thereby joining in with the dictates of her 
community. The issue of slavery and Hawthorne’s response to it is of vital 
importance, particularly considering Hawthorne’s years-long, passion-
ate friendship with his former Bowdoin classmate Franklin Pierce, the 
Fourteenth President (1853–1857), and political appointments within the 
Democratic Party. Yet what remains curious in Arac’s approach—which I 
view as emblematic of the broadly Foucauldian approach to nineteenth-
century American writing he and Bercovitch innovated—is his reliance 
upon masculinist gendered standards.
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First, Arac rather nostalgically reclaims Hawthorne, along with Harriet 
Beecher Stowe, as a self-consciously political author writing in a time 
when it “was not yet taken for granted that literature must be intransitive, 
useless as well as harmless.”20 Hawthorne, Arac notes, “recognized slavery 
as potentially divisive, and he did not favor slavery; he only urged that 
nothing be done about it” (254). Hawthorne “envisaged” the “logic of 
romance” for American politics, since he shuddered at the thought of the 
“horrible convulsion,” “this dreadful convulsive action” as Sophia Haw-
thorne echoed it, of the Civil War. “Action is intolerable; character takes 
its place,” Arac surmises. Hawthorne inherits the Romantic reinterpreta-
tion of Hamlet, its rejection of Aristotelian theories of character as one 
who “acts.” Now, as Hawthorne’s narration-heavy writing demonstrates, 
literary character becomes “one who is known” (255). “Hawthorne’s 
name circulated as a sign in a complex system of exchange that made 
it worth the [Democratic] party’s while to provide him a livelihood and 
that gave him the character of a Democrat without requiring action” 
(256). Reminding us of Hawthorne’s “abject identity with Coverdale” in 
Hawthorne’s 1852 novel The Blithedale Romance, Arac reduces Hawthorne’s 
life and work to a philosophy of “Let others do it” (260). 
Like Cheyfitz, Arac chafes against Hawthorne’s apparently “immoral 
passivity.” But Arac blinds us to the political work undertaken by the 
novel, perhaps failing to see that it is precisely through Coverdale’s mis-
anthropy, through Hawthorne’s own perversity, that this political work is 
conducted. As Irving Howe wrote of the novel in his essay “The Politics 
of Isolation,” Hawthorne harshly critiques the utopian’s impulse to “cut 
himself off from the ugly world.” In order “to preserve his utopia,” he 
must “become a ‘practical agriculturist’—which means to model his 
utopia upon the society he rejects. This criticism, which strikes so hard 
a blow at the political fancies of many 19th century American intellectu-
als, is advanced by Hawthorne with a cruel and almost joyous insistence, 
but that does not make it any the less true. Hawthorne, of course, was 
as far from the Marxist imagination as anyone could be, but almost any 
criticism of utopian politics from a point of view committed to struggle 
within the world would have to render a similar judgment.”21 Hawthorne’s 
identification with Coverdale does more than simply confirm Hawthorne’s 
love of inaction, his aesthetic and social politics of “uselessness.” It also 
reminds us that Hawthorne’s work critiques the very same stringent gen-
dered standards that undergird (unwittingly, I presume) critiques such 
as Arac’s. Coverdale is many unpleasant things, but he is also a severe 
critic of the misogyny and hypocrisy embodied in the most ambiguous 
character in the book, the social reformer Hollingsworth, the object of 
the novel’s most stinging critique.22 
Arac and Rowe sound an awful lot like the people in Hawthorne’s 
circle who frowned at his effeminacy. “The self-doubts, the uncertainty, 
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the sense that even his best gifts were not entirely admirable did little 
to enhance Hawthorne’s confidence in his own masculinity. In this 
area, too, he was split, and in ways recognizable to his contemporaries. 
Lowell, Longfellow, Alcott, Emerson, and Margaret Fuller all observed 
a doubleness of sensibility to which Julian Hawthorne also attested. 
These observers reported traits of coyness, passivity, and an intuitive-
ness regarded as feminine but mingled with a genuine manliness. They 
reported the double sensitivity without sneers, but rather as indicative of 
a fuller nature than uniformity would produce.”23 Hawthorne always had 
his champions, but sneers certainly came his way as well. For example, 
in his June 13, 1838 journal entry, Emerson wrote of Hawthorne: “Alcott 
and he together would make a man.”24 Overall, Hawthorne’s gendered 
identity quivered with anxieties threatening to spill out at any time. As 
Brenda Wineapple reports, even the early praise Hawthorne received 
could be irritatingly suggestive of his gendered instabilities. “Park Ben-
jamin went so far as to characterize ‘the soul of Nathaniel Hawthorne’ 
as ‘a rose bathed and baptized in dew,’ a maddening, insulting phrase 
that Hawthorne caught.”25 Hawthorne’s gendered intermixture was both 
deeply appealing and vexing for many, certainly for himself; it continues 
to be vexing to several critics.
The rigid impulse to transmogrify all aesthetic production into politi-
cal “action” relies upon a hierarchical logic of categories of gendered 
identity and qualities, with masculine action, rationalism, certainty, and 
absolutism at the very top. These are the very standards that informed 
and organized the Jacksonian man-on-the-make manhood that Hawthorne 
both supported and critiqued in his work and continue to shape stan-
dards of normative American manhood. Arac’s critique of Hawthorne’s 
inaction echoes longstanding Puritan clichés conflating idle hands and 
devil’s work, his rhetoric remarkably similar to that of the antebellum 
reformers in their screeds against the sensual lassitude to which young 
men especially were susceptible and which almost inevitably led to the 
pernicious solitary vice of onanism. Moreover, the indolence of the 
inactive male writer coalesces rather too easily into such calumniated 
antebellum categories such as foppishness and luxury, which rendered 
the male subject who fell into them feminized.26 Certainly, I, too, cringe 
at Hawthorne’s political lapses, most kindly termed his moral myopia. But 
I also cringe at the aspects of leftist thought that uncritically perpetuate 
biases that rely upon gendered conventions and commonplaces. 27
Decadent Liberalism
Writing in a 1983 collection of Marxist-Foucauldian feminist essays, 
Powers of Desire, psychoanalytic theorist Jessica Benjamin made the point 
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that any political criticism had to take account of “the erotic, fantastic 
components of human life.”28 Benjamin’s advice has not been heeded, 
particularly in leftist criticism, which eschews the erotic, reifies the fan-
tastic into further political product, and overlooks or obscures the impor-
tance of personal fantasy to the reading of literature. Critically occluded 
and duplicitously presented (in that the presentation purports to take 
seriously what it only obligatorily makes note of), textual desire—desire 
as it emanates from the shared space of the author’s mind, the text, the 
reader’s mind, and the mutual needs of each to give life to the other—
remains a crucial aspect of the work, in all of the multivalent capacities 
of the term, of literature. In its obfuscation of desire, leftist criticism 
fails to recognize it as a category of human experience, as relevant as 
any other, to say nothing of its importance to literary art or its role in 
political matters.29 Moreover, psychoanalysis—despite its considerable 
ideological lapses, the major discipline to treat issues of both gender 
and desire—rarely receives mention, and, when it does, this attention is 
mostly dismissive if not derisive.30 
The oft-stated goals of leftist criticism remain salutary ones. We have 
to continue to wage our battles against the myriad forms of oppression, 
both as that oppression manifested itself in the past and takes shape 
in the present. Yet the manner in which academic criticism goes about 
dismantling the machines of oppression mechanizes literature and the 
act of critical appraisal; it turns the text into a machine, the critic into 
the ultimate machinist. The particular kind of leftist criticism I’ve been 
examining here insists upon the material reality of all aspects of art. In 
so doing, it proceeds from a fatal literal-mindedness that reflects what 
Irving Howe called “the mania for certainty,” in this case the absolutist 
insistence on the empirical verifiability of every literary quality.31 Litera-
ture is always about ideological commitments, but it is also no less deeply 
an attempt, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has put it, to say the unsayable; it’s 
precisely this fundamentally unrationalizable aspect of literature that left-
ist criticism fails to acknowledge and that causes it the greatest amount 
of consternating difficulty.32 
I propose that what we need instead of this new literary positivism is a 
decadent liberalism, one as alive to the perverse and unstable qualities of art 
as it is to the pressing, profound ideological realities of which literature 
is not only a response but also a reflection. We need a liberalism that 
can encompass the disorientingly wide range of effects, concerns, quali-
ties, achievements, failures, and maddening paradoxes of literature, of 
all art. This liberalism is decadent in at least two senses of that term—it 
acknowledges its own failure (no system can be the complete filter for 
all that passes through it), and it embraces perversity (both its own as 
a methodology and that within the objects it studies). Leftist literary 
criticism needs to make a place for the erotic and for fantasy, for the 
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inexpressible and the irreducibly mysterious, for the irrational, in short, 
for the perversities of literary art.
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